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104 Chantal Mou.ffe 
determining in the last instance those things which in fact provide its conditions 
of existence. So, one has to think in different ways. That is the conclusion we 
came to in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy but it took some time to work 
through. And of course, that is also linked to the critique which I ended up 
making of Gramsci because I, in my previous work on Gramsci before Hege-
mony and Socialist Strategy, still agreed with Gramsci on the idea that only the 
working class could provide the articulating principle of the new democratic 
hegemony. I was trying to bring in the new .movements and the importance of 
feminism and other struggles believing that there was some kind of necessary 
centrality of the working class. That is something which we abandoned in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
We came to abandon the idea that it was only the working class that could 
provide the articulating principle of a hegemony. Of course, it does not mean 
that in some countries it cannot be the working class. But in other countries it 
can be some other group and sometimes there is not even an articulating 
principle. Sometimes there is hegemony without an hegemonic center. For 
instance, it might in many cases be a situation in which no particular group is 
dominant. So, that is something I personally see as a break with my work on 
Gramsci before Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. At that point my work really 
became post-marxist because once you abandon the centrality of the working 
class you are obviously post-marxist. 
It does not mean I was rejecting everything of marxism. I still feel that there 
are many important concerns about the struggle around class which are post-
marxism' s contributions to the formulation of a left perspective. In the same 
way, feminism insists on the importance of the feminist question. I see very 
much marxism as part of a wider project but not at all as providing the theory, 
the master theory. And of course, I feel the same way with respect to feminism. 
Feminism is one component in a much wider perspective on democratic 
struggle. 
disQosure: Are there any last comments? If there are not, there is one last thing 
we would like to ask you. One gets the impression from listening and talking 
to you that your view of radical and plural democracy is related to the 
Trotskyian notion of a "permanent revolution". Could you clarify the differ-
ence for us? 
Mouffe: No, it abandons the idea of revolution. In societies like the USA or 
Western Europe, "permanent revolution" does not make sense because it 
means transforming completely the very basis of society and I do not think we 
need that. All the goals of radical democracy, and I would say even the socialist 
goals in terms of the democratization of the economy, can be done perfectly well 
within the current tradition. 
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This interoiew was conducted during a visit Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis made 
to the University of Kentucky to give the lecture "Economic Democracy and Democratic 
Organizations" as part of the 1993 Spring Social Theory Lecture Series sponsored by 
the university's interdisciplinary Committee on Social Theory. It is divided into three 
parts; the first dealing with concepts of the state and uneven geographical development, 
the second dealing with the recent resurgence of interest in the ideas of 11 civil society" 
and the 11 end of history11 and the third with economic and political transition in Eastern 
Europe. 
I. State, Power and Uneven Development 
Popke: I think a good way to lead this interview off is to refer to the institutional 
accommodations that you spoke of in Democracy and Capitalism. In the last 
chapter you outline three distinct possibilities for the future articulations of 
political and economic formations: "global-liberalism," which would entail the 
worldwide growth of markets and capital mobility so as to erode national 
sovereignty; "neo-Hobbesianism," which represents an expansion of hierarchi-
cal institutions of authority in the political sphere; and "postliberal democ-
racy," which combines decentralized control of productive forces with demo-
cratic control of the economy. What can you say about contemporary conditions 
and their dynamics, given these three models? 
Bowles: Well, of these obviously the most vibrant power in the world today is 
global liberalism. The spread of free trade as an ideology and set of social 
policies is a powerful movement in the world today and it has found support 
in a lot of historically unprecedented places. It has found strong support among 
many Third World governments; as exemplified by Mexico's enthusiastic 
support of the North American so-called free trade agreement. So I think that 
global liberalism is the dominant tendency in the world today. It will pose the 
dominant challenge to the Left, which will have to address the issue of 
increased mobility of goods and services in the world. This will be a challenge 
to find ways of continuing to express the hopes and aspirations of working 
people in an arena in which capital is more than ever willing to use the threat 
of mobility against populist and democratic movements. 
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Popke: In fact, you have defined this mobility as one distinct type of power 
conferred on capital. In Democracy and Capitalism you speak of three types of 
power in particular: the first is command over production, the second is 
command over investment, and the third is what you refer to as influence over 
state policy, which capital holds by virtue of its mobility. Given the emphasis 
you placed upon capital mobility and free trade in your previous answer, I 
wonder if you see any checks to this sort of power over the state? 
Bowles: Yes, I do. First, the power capital has over the state is gained not only 
by dint of the threat of leaving, but much more directly simply by the use of its 
financial resources to influence the outcome of political processes, both elec-
toral and executive. Together, the interaction of money and politics and the 
threat of mobility are complimentary; one greatly empowers the other. How-
ever, there are checks on that threat, so one ought not to exaggerate the viability 
of the threat of moving. When corporations threaten to leave, say North 
America, and head south to a country with low wages, they rarely do so. In fact, 
three quarters of the assets of US firms outside of the United States are in North 
America, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand-that is, they are not in 
low wage countries at all. And two-thirds of the employees of US corporations 
outside of the United States are not in Third World countries, they are in 
advanced countries. In other words, many corporations are leaving the United 
States to go to countries where on the average the wages and the rates of 
unionization are higher than in the United States. The idea that somehow the 
corporations are going to hold a gun to the head of local and national govern-
ments and say /1 do it our way or we are going to walk" is not a credible threat 
in the vast majority of cases. 
This is particularly the case now that the US is a relatively low wage 
country among the advanced capitalist nations. There are now 12 countries in 
which the average wage for manufacturing is higher than the United States, and 
it is those countries that get the lion's share of investments by US firms outside 
the United States. This is a fact that is very poorly understood by activists on 
the Left and in the trade union movement who think that of course their jobs are 
flying away to "Southern Somewhere". What we think of is the ads run in 
industry newspapers, for example The Bobbin, a textile industry newspaper, 
which shows a picture of Rosa Martinez, who works for 57 cents an hour and 
is inviting you to come and employ her in El Salvador. That is the image that 
we have of the mobility of capital, but in fact what it is doing is going to 
Germany, where they pay their machinists $22 an hour. True, capital may well 
move, but it may move to countries that have a better educational system than 
ours, a better infrastructure, better labor relations, and indeed a better structure 
of production in general. 
The other thing of course is international finance. People are very misin-
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formed about the extent to which international finance is important. In 
virtually every country over 90% of the investment is domestically financed. In 
most countries it is more like 97%. In other words, very little depends on the 
international flow of capital. But if the world really were a /1 global-liberal" 
ideal, the location of investment would be uninfluenced by the country of origin 
of that investment. That is, there would be a mass of savings in the world and 
there would be a large number of locations on which it might land, and there 
would be no relationship between the source of the savings and the destination 
of actual investment. Far from that situation, there is an extraordinarily strong 
relationship between domestic savings and domestic investment. 
There are many reasons for this, though it doesn't particularly have to do 
with transportation costs-if you try to predict where corporations go, distance 
isn't really the main feature. There appear in fact to be trading blocks which 
reliably predict where companies move. These arise, I presume, from concerns 
surrounding the enforcement of contracts, the business climate, and informa-
tion. There is good econometric evidence on location now suggesting that 
things like education, a low level of risk, English language, and Latin America 
arethethingsthatpredictwhere US firms go. Theinvestmentprocesscontinues 
to be a profoundly national phenomenon. Corporations have not liberated 
themselves from the state and have not liberated themselves from national 
patterns. These patterns have a geographical aspect, but the geographical 
aspect is of course a token of political and presumably military and other 
enforcement aspects. 
So, yes, there are checks on the mobility of capital, but the biggest check has 
to do with politics. In the end, capital strike, the freedom of capital to move, 
wouldn't be powerful if people felt they had an alternative, because the bottom 
line for the labor movement is that when corporations move they don't move 
the machines. Ask yourself what do they take? They don't take the skills, they 
don't take the machines, and they don't take the resource base. What they do 
is take pieces of paper, and if communities and nations and organizations of 
citizens and workers were prepared, when the threat of leaving was an-
nounced, they could counter that threat with "you can leave, but the factory 
stays here and we are prepared to run it." If they could then gain the support 
of local public financial institutions you would have a viable counter threat to 
the threat of capital strike. 
Popke: One of the justifications offered by proponents of the "global-liberal" 
model is that it will tend to even the economic playing field. Capital will move 
to places where it previously didn't exist, because of the comparative advan-
tages of those areas, with the eventual result that regions and sectors will 
approach a common economic standard. Your remarks here about the intrin-
sically national character of investment would seem to dispute this, and might 
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instead support the arguments of David Harvey and others that contemporary 
capitalism is by its very nature spatially uneven. Perhaps you could say of the 
current contemporary capitalist accommodation that one of its features is this 
sort of spatial differentiation. 
Staddon: Yes, I was thinking along the same line-you know Harvey's 
argument that the capital valorization proces.s, right at the heart of the beast so 
to speak, involves the exploitation of geographical differences. In his view, the 
construction of geographical differences from place to place, and the exploita-
tion of those differences, is central to the process of capital accumulation. 
Bowles: I could not establish a general tendency towards uneven development. 
At the theoretical level, I don't think there is one. On the other hand, I think the 
following is also true: in recent years, meaning the last thirty, there has been 
undoubtedly a tendency towards disequaliz.ation of income between nations, 
with the poorer nations falling behind and the richer nations pulling ahead. I 
mean this literally; if you calculate a Lorenz curve for world income inequality 
on the assumption that income within nations is equal, so we look only at 
differences among nations, the Lorenz curve for the present is considerably 
more unequal than the Lorenz curve for 1960. If you took China out of this 
speculation, which one ought if one wants to look at the dynamics of capitalism, 
then the tendencies towards disequalization in the world capitalist economy 
are very strong. 
On theoretical grounds, however, it seems to me that the exploitation of 
geographical differences may lead to disequalization or it may lead to equaliza-
tion. Certainly among a subset of countries we are seeing a very rapid process 
of catching up. If you look for example at wage growth in major industrial 
countries, wages in several east Asian countries are growing extraordinarily 
rapidly, even as wages in the US keep on falling. So among the players who are 
successful in the game we are seeing a process of equalization. On the other 
hand we see Africa, parts of Latin America, and other regions falling further 
behind in their wage levels. Note that when The Bobbin re-ran their Rosa 
Martinez advertisement, her wages had actually fallen to 33 cents per hour. 
One thing you might be able to establish at the theoretical level is that free 
trade is often bad for workers. The reason for this is, very roughly, that the 
ability of citizens to redistribute income through such mechanisms as welfare 
state provisions, unemployment insurance and so on, and to protect themselves 
from the power of capital depends upon electoral competition. Of course 
voters' willingness to use these tools depends on the extent to which they think 
that when they do use them they will not drive away capital. It is probably the 
case that in the world today raising real wages will reduce employment in 
national economies. That is, the higher the real wage, the lower will be the 
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overall level of employment. In a dosed economy this might not be the case; the 
more ~pen the ~conomy is to international supply and demand for goods the 
more likely that is to be the case. So as economies become more open, the ability 
of working clas.s organizations, social democratic parties and other parties of 
the Left to push egalitarian state policies is increasingly constrained. 
In particular cases this tendency of openness being bad for workers in both 
rich and poor countries may be exacerbated. The North American, so-called 
free trade agreement is a very good example. Here it seems likely that wages 
in the US will fall as a result of the agreement with Mexico and that wages in 
Mexico will also fall as a result of the influx into Mexico of comparatively cheap 
US grown com which will bankrupt Mexican farmers, who will then flood 
Mexican cities with workers competing for jobs. Yet the total number of jobs can 
only increase by significantly less than the growth in the number of job seekers. 
So the arithmetic in this situation is that enough firms will move South to reduce 
wages in the US, but nowhere near enough to employ all the farmers who will 
be bankrupte_d by the US com that is also going to move South. So the somewhat 
improbable, but I think inescapable, conclusion is that freer trade and freer 
investment flows between the US and Mexico will actually hurt the low end of 
the income distribution of both countries. 
There may be a lot of cases like the Mexico / US case. To the extent that there 
are, then a general tendency towards geographical equalization would obtain. 
And such a tendency may be the dominant tendency operating in the world 
today. But I wouldn't want to try to establish it on theoretical ground because 
clearly, Rosa Martinez, whether she works for 57 cents an hour or 33, wouldn't 
haveapayingjobatallifitweren'tforthefactthatsomecompany hadleftNorth 
Carolina and employed her in El Salvador. 
Lewis: I want to keep to the geographical theme, though perhaps intranational 
unevenness might be a particularly interesting theme. Does it imply new forms 
of politics and political actions? 
Staddon: Yes, let's keep with the theme of geographical differentiation. While 
there are certainly proces.ses of internationalization and globalization occur-
~g, these seem to be correlated with starkly opposing tendencies: namely, a 
~qualization or fragmentation which creates pockets of places with very 
different capital/labor, investment/ accumulation ratios, wage rates, produc-
tivity rates, etc. In fact we make a mistake if we perceive of uneven international 
development as separate from uneven intranational development. 
Bo~les: In other words, your hypothesis is that whatever is going on between 
nations, within nations there is a disequalization associated with uneven 
development between sectors of the labor market? This is certainly true for the 
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US. It's much less true in Europe. In the US this has a lot to do with the decline 
of trade unionism, the gutting of income support programs, particularly 
unemployment insurance, as well as the other fall-back payment schemes, such 
as AFDC, and so on. These defeats have had a lot to do with the increasing 
segmentation of the US labor force. 
One of the biggest challenges to activists on the Left is "Will the globalization 
of production render the state ineffective in intervening to stop the process of 
disequalization within countries?" The answer to this question is not in, 
though there are a lot of negative feelings that not much can be done. But the 
evidence is overwhelmingly positive rather than negative. There are a number 
of very egalitarian countries which are doing very well in terms of economic 
performance. And there is certainly no evidence that countries are invariably 
forced into inegalitarian positions because of international competition. If you 
look for example at trade shares-that is, which countries have gained most or 
lost most in shares of world trade-those which are very inegalitarian, like the 
US, have lost a lot. On the other hand, those countries which are highly 
egalitarian are the ones who have gained most in shares of world trade. I'm 
thinking not simply of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, which are very income 
egalitarian in comparison to the US, but also of Norway, Sweden, and Austria 
as well. All of these countries have far better trade share records than the US. 
It doesn't seem to me that there is a lot of evidence for the argument that 
egalitarianism in income distribution has been defeated by globalization. It's 
possible, but we would then have to explain away the countries that I just 
mentioned. It seems to me that rather than explaining them away, we should 
learn from them and find out why in these countries' egalitarianism was 
compatible with successful economic performance. 
Staddon: One major empirical difference between countries like Norway and 
Korea on one hand and countries like the US on the other, pertains to domestic 
political structure. Fairly well vertically integrated national political states, 
such as Korea and Norway, appear to contrast sharply with the US state-led 
federalist model. Here in the US, with a less strongly vertically integrated 
national state, the politics of development have adopted much more of a 
"beggar thy neighbor" approach; where Kentucky's gain of Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing is directly Ohio's or Tennessee's loss. This seems to breed, of its 
verynature,asortof"zero-sum"politics, whichdirectlyreinforcesintranational 
uneven development. 
Bowles: Well, it may be that the kind of egalitarianism that works is that which 
succeeds in fostering cooperative low cost solutions to conflicts. That kind of 
egalitarianism may require a kind of communitarian base, which is possible or 
likely in countries which have more homogeneous populations. If the secret of 
Korea, Japan, Norway, Sweden then, is that they have relatively homogeneous 
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populations, this is very discouraging to those of us who would like to see a 
more pluralistic politics succeed. It is often said that egalitarianism works in 
favor of economic productivity where you have a homogeneous population 
and where egalitarianism can be the basis for trust and cooperation between 
potentially conflicting parties. Where you don't have that communitarian basis 
for cooperative solutions to potentially conflicting situations, you end up w ith 
the sort of economically and politically disadvantageous fragmentation you 
describe. 
Ontheotherhand,Ithinkthatitisnotatallobviousthat thecommunitarian 
basis of egalitarian policies has to be at the national level. There is for example 
some evidence from the so-called Third Italy that it is precisely the community 
base of these "third Italian" towns (such as Bologna) that has greatly augmented 
their abilities to be very successful industrially. These towns also provide many 
publicly funded services; from education to roads to training to the marketing 
of goods produced by small industries. This has been a very effective industrial 
strategy, and it is mostly based on Leftist local governments providing a 
tremendous range of social services and infrastructure which then provides the 
basis for a very entrepreneurial small-scale capitalism which works. That's not 
all one could hope for in a good society, but it certainly is a viable future which 
raises living standards in a way which is widely shared. 
II. Civil Society and the "End of History'' 
Lewis: In our discussion we seem to have converged upon the crucial linkage 
between economic arrangements ai:id theories of politics and governance. To 
continue with the latter: In classical political theory, "state" has been conceived 
of as an institutional domain, mediating between civil society and economy. 
But much recent political thought, which has come in the wake of Eastern 
European regime collapse, has suggested that civil society should be theorized 
as a domain of action or institutions that mediates between state and economy. 
There is a seeming dislocation in the roles of state and civil society here. Given 
the importance of governance issues in your thinking, could you share some of 
your thoughts on the recent fascination with civil society or the reemergence of 
civil societies? 
Bowles: Citizens in the formerly totalitarian states find themselves bereft of 
social networks, lacking that is, what in this country we call voluntary non-
profit organizations and the like, which provide the basis for personal and 
political identities. They also provide a very important aspect of the delivery 
of services, political expression, community formation, the construction of 
identity and so on. When people talk about civil society in Eastern Europe what 
they are hoping to create is nothing very remarkable or theoretically complex. 
What they are looking for are the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts and they are 
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looking for a Little League and all kinds Rotaries and Lions Clubs and organi-
zations of hunters and sports fans and all the kinds of things that make a society 
more multifaceted. These are a significant part of the evolution of an identity 
and a political subject which is multifaceted and neither jingoistically patriotic 
nor anonymously individualistic. 
There is a terrifying possibility that the people of Eastern Europe will be left 
in as alienated and anonymous a situation as people are in this country. 
Ironically they see the US as a model because of the rather large number of 
voluntary associations in this country, but then if that's what they want, 
liberalism is not their answer. The th.rust of the market and the thrust of liberal 
ideology is to gradually undermine and erode the conditions favoring coopera-
tion. This leaves people with a sparse menu of institutions to serve as a basis 
for their identity: their families and their nation. It is rather distressing if these 
are to be the basis for our solidarity with our fellow human beings. The future 
of such a politics is very dismal indeed. However, I don't think that will be the 
case. I suspect that other forms of identification will be sought and will be 
found, including of course political parties. 
Staddon: To pick up on the point that you just made, it does seem ironic that 
many of the Eastern European countries, in elaborating their ideas about civil 
society, look to the US as a model of a working civil society. The irony is that 
in this country there are a number of social theorists-I'm thinking of Daniel 
Boorstin, Louis Hartz and Daniel Bell-who look at the relation between civil 
society and the state in terms of what Hartz called "The Genius of American 
Politics"; that is to say, the way in which the relationship between state and civil 
society has developed to the point where meaningful dissent is infinitely co-
optable. This leads someone like Francis Fukuyama to revisit the venerable old 
Hegelian chestnut that we have reached the "end of history," since we have 
attained a political form in which political differences are ultimately assimilable 
and therefore the historical contest between political collectivities is ended. 
Bowles: This idea of the "end of history" is a cyclical fad. When I was at 
university in the 1950s it was also thriving; the age of "isms" was said to be over. 
At the same time I learned that the business cycle was over. The "end of 
ideology" signalled by Daniel Bell was at hand. But no sooner had we learned 
that the "isms" were all false anachronisms, when the 60s happened, forcing us 
to take account of the fact that there remained many, many systemic differences 
in the world. Now the conflicts of the 1960s weren't exactly the social conflicts 
that those of us who by that time had become Marxists would have anticipated. 
In this country for example while there were many class aspects of the social 
conflicts of the 60s, race, gender and citizen/state relations were at least as 
dominant. The same was true to varying degrees in other parts of the world. 
-
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The idea that history has once again "ended" merely means that the 
parameters that define what we thought was "history'' in the past, have 
themselves become old fashioned. The ideology of the struggle between 
capitalism and communism is probably the one that we can most securely lay 
to rest. But the idea that the struggle between the class of people who own the 
means of production and run most of the countries of the world, and the people 
whodotheworkandgohometiredatnightmightbeoverispatentlyfalse. That 
struggle hasn't ended and it won't end as long as the process of uneven 
development continues. Given this process of global disequali zation, I suspect 
that class, racial, national and gender differences in economic opportunity will 
provide the basis for, but not determine the expr~ion of, political protest. And 
this will make sure that history will be with us for some time to come. 
Lewis: You suggest that what is commonly understood as "history" should 
itself be rethought; that history should not conceived as a teleological principle. 
Rather, perhaps the unfolding of social arrangements should be though of as an 
uneven, nonlinear proc~. 
Bowles: H history is a teleological process, it not only has not died, it probably 
never was born. But what I really meant by the "end of history" is the end of 
conflict among collective actors in history with the pos.sible outcome of these 
conflicts being radical structural change. Now it seems remarkable that 
anybody who has witnessed the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union in the last five years would say that history has ended, for we have just 
seen one of the most dramatic chapters of history as I have just defined it. And 
the fall of communism would not seem to exhaust the pos.sibilities of history as 
long as we have an unjust world, confronting an environmental crisis; a crisis 
which will be the basis of forms of collective action and collective struggles and 
conflict which will be parallel with, and perhaps more important than, class 
conflicts. 
When people say that history is over, they often mean that the history that 
Karl Marx defined is over, and they often mistakenly think that the absence of 
groups identified as "classes" being political actors means that class conflict is 
no longer taking place. There is a genuine source of confusion here. Liberal-
speakhas become the lexicon of politics: "rights" arewhatyou use to assert your 
position; this is true whether you are working class or whether you are lesbians 
and gays or whether you're a dentist. Whatever you are, if you are a political 
actor, you draw upon the discourse of liberal rights. That being the case it's not 
surprising that some people have been confused into thinking that issues of 
exploitation and domination in the workplace have faded into unimportance, 
because the actors in asserting their demands as workers often sound more like 
John Stuart Mill than Karl Marx. Nonetheless, the underlying dynamic of these 
struggles often includes a class aspect, having to do with the process of 
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investment, relocation of industry, choice of technology, wages, working 
conditions and control over the process of production. 
III. Democracy and Transition in Eastern Europe 
Staddon: The third part of this interview concerns democracy and East 
European transition. We are well past the first flush of excitement attending the 
fall of Eastern European totalitarianism, and for many of these new gove:n-
ments, the honeymoon is definitely over. For example, already we are seeing 
the beginnings of the collapse of the original anti-comm~t c~alitions .. In 
Bulgaria, where my own research is located, this fragmen~tlon IS occ~.g 
very rapidly indeed. At the same time the process of econorruc restructuring IS 
largely stalled. Yet there is still a prevalence, especially among western 
scholars, to assume thatthe processes of democratization and marketization are 
necessarily convergent. So let me start by asking, ''Do you perceive any 
necessary connections between the processes of democratization and 
marketization"? Someone like Adam Przeworski, for example, has argued that 
in most Eastern Europe contingencies, marketization and democratization may 
in fact be divergent and indeed contradictory. 
Bowles: I think Przeworski is right in his generalconclusions, but let me go back 
a bit and reframe the question. Capitalist markets and democracy coincide 
historically. The question we have to address is, "Is there a logical affinity 
between these two systems, in the sense that one either requires or supports the 
other?" The spread of what I call democracy, which is universal suffrage in fair 
elections and civil liberties, is a very recent phenomenon. It's a twentieth-
century phenomenon; no country in the world was democratic by my defini-
tion before 1900. Rather than seeing democracy as being a creation of the rising 
emergent capitalist class and imagining somehow that the French Revolution 
brought democracy to France (which is historically false), it is a better historical 
account, I think, to see democracy, at least its culmination in universal suffrage, 
as having emerged out of the struggle between capital and labor in the late 19th 
and early 20th century. Under different historical circumstances the outcome 
might have been different. Capitalism in the Third World has rarely stimulated 
democratization and where it has it has not been by the same set of circum-
stances which obtained in Western Europe. 
So there is every reason to believe that the relationship between democracy 
and capitalism is permissive in the sense that it is clear that you can have a 
capitalist and a liberal democratic society. It is not clear what other kinds ?f 
economies can coexist with liberal democracy. Milton Friedmann is correct m 
pointing out that we learn something from the co-existence of perhaps twenty-
five capitalist economies and democratic states in the world. But we ~ho~d 
remember that twenty-five democratic/ capitalist countries is a small rrunonty 
-
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of all the capitalist countries in the world. Most of the other seventy-five are not 
democratic by any stretch of the imagination. 
In Eastern Europe the circumstances may be somewhat more favorable for 
the emergence of democratic rule, because there you have very large and quite 
well organized working classes, with an egalitarian ideology which will have 
to be accommodated in the political process somehow. It doesn't strike me as 
being unlikely that they would be accommodated through suffrage, presum-
ably also through populist political organization, which might very w ell take 
democratic forms. But one does not have in Eastern Europe the other part of the 
co-evolution of capitalism and liberal democracy which has to do with the long 
development of liberal rights and strong notions of privacy. It is a dis.W:bing 
aspect of the Eastern European revolutions to see .the strong a:1ti-l~beral 
tendencies of some of the emergent regimes on questlons of abortlon n ghts, 
ethnicity and the treatment of gender issues. People on the Left often say that 
the working class will be the loser in the revolu tions of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Maybe not. The working classes may be the gainers from ~e 
reformulation of their economies and the extension of democracy. Even so, it 
seems very likely that women w ill be the losers in the revolutions in E~tern 
Europeatleastin theshortrun becauseof theshiftinsocial policy aroundlSS~es 
of gender, reflecting the anti-liberal cultural traditions in some of those societ-
ies. 
Staddon: This might be an interesting point for comment. I have recently been 
involved in survey work in Bulgaria, in which we asked people a range of 
questions about their perceptions of the proper relationships between ~estate 
and the economic system particularly in terms of managing productlon, b~t 
also in terms of providing consumption goods. The working hypothesis, 
derived largely from Western literature, was that popular support for the state 
as an economic actor would erode very rapidly, in support of some form of 
~ez-faire. Strongly to the contrary, we actually found that people couldn't 
agree strongly enough with statements like-" the government should control 
heavy industry" and "the government should ensure that there a~e a~equate 
well paying jobs." And they couldn't express strongly enough ~err disagr~ 
ment with statements like "the government has no right to interfere with 
private enterprise." These results initially seemed somewhat anomalous. 
Bowles: I have recently spent some time in Eastern Europe and in Russia 
dealing with questions of economic reform and the social safety net as well as 
new forms of labor-management relations. My impression is, .fro1:'- the trade 
union and other groups that I have talked to there, that marke~tlon and ~e 
market are primarily political slogans. They're slogans having to do w~th 
reducing the irresponsible and unaccountable power of the state~ not w~th 
as.signing a role for the state in accord w ith any w ell worked out lalSSez-faire 
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economic program. The market is understood primarily as a weapon against 
thenomenklatura. Butwhilethemarketissometimesaneffectivepoliticaldevice 
for limiting the role of state bureaucracy, it is not a very effective way to 
stimulate the process of economic growth. Rather, a combination of a highly 
interventionist state along with markets used to discipline agents and weed out 
firms that are failing is a strategy which appears to work well. That is the case 
whether we are talking about the 'Third Italy" or South Korea. The idea that 
somehow markets themselves will promote development is mistaken. It hasn't 
been the case in the Third World and it's unlikely in the future to be the case 
anywhere else. 
What I hope is that the value of the market as a decentralized mechanism 
for disciplining both governments and private economic agents will be appre-
ciated in Eastern Europe. But in the reaction against programs of "shock 
therapy" and market reforms, what we may find is a re-stabilization of the 
Eastern European economies together with the protection of all actors from 
accountability. In the end, it would be absurd for an egalitarian society not to 
use markets as a means of the decentralized enforcement of standards and 
accountability on its economic actors. 
Our objections to markets primarily have to do with their inegalitarian 
consequences where you have a very unequal distribution of property. The 
new argument for markets is one which stresses that they are a way of 
disciplining agents which is very difficult to corrupt, unlike states which are 
quite eeiS}_' to corrupt. This is a powerful argument. Once we recognize that 
market failures are prevalent, as in cases of environmental pollution and ought 
to be corrected and that markets impose an inequality on society unless assets 
are redistributed---once we recognize those two important caveats-markets 
could be used effectively as an important device for selecting winners and 
losers and thereby establishing accountability, but their role must be strictly 
limited to that. 
Staddon: The sociologist George Kolankiewicz has suggested that markets 
seem to be based in the Eastern European context on the institution of civil 
rights, what we recognize as the rights of the individual over and against the 
state. Further he suggests that these civil rights will come in to clear conflict with 
entrenched social rights; the rights concerning what people expect from the 
state as opposed to their civil rights over and against the state. Have you any 
thoughts on the potential conflict? 
~owle~: Well, I spe~t some time in Prague working with a group of people 
mc~uding :eform-~ded economists and solidaristic-minded people from 
social service agencies. They were what we would call "social safety net" 
agencies, and this tension which you describe could not have been more clear 
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between those two groups: one emphasizes the market as an arena of negative 
liberty that ~.owed ~ou to say what the state could not do to you and the other 
argues that it is precisely because people have rights that the state should take 
care
1 
of th~m in distress, in bad luck or any other adversity. That's true, but 
yo~ ll noti~e th~re are areas of the world which we admire precisely because of 
their combination of an extension of rights against the state with an extension 
of rights to expect direct material assistance from the state. The existence of such 
countries would suggestthatKolankiewicz may be overly pessimistic. Take for 
example the social democratic nations which have a very rich commitment by 
the.sta~e ~ pro~ide. things to the citizenry and at the same time an ideology 
which ts libertarian m other areas of life regarding what the state can do to you. 
I don't see any intrinsic contradiction between the notion of the high level of 
development of negative liberty in the area of social ~ues like sexual orienta-
tio~, ci~il liberties, and freedom of speech combined with a strong element of 
solidarity towards others when they are in distress. This can, I think, be 
demonstrated by the successful cases of social democracy. 
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